---
id: trust-conformance
title: "Standards Support and Conformance: Trust in the iGrant.io Organisation Wallet Suite"
description: Which ETSI, IETF and OpenID specifications the trust checks of the iGrant.io Organisation Wallet Suite implement, how it meets the trust requirements of the ARF v3.0.0 for verifiers, holder wallets, issuers and wallet providers, and the gaps that remain.
hide_title: false
sidebar_label: Standards and Conformance
keywords: [conformance, ARF v3.0.0, high-level requirements, OIA_12, ISSU_21, RPA_04, RPRC_17, CT_05, ETSI TS 119 612, ETSI TS 119 602, ETSI TS 119 475, registration certificate, WRPRC, certificate transparency, gaps, Organisation Wallet Suite, WE BUILD]
slug: /trust-conformance/
---

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<head>
  <title>Standards Support and Conformance: Trust in the iGrant.io Organisation Wallet Suite | iGrant.io DevDocs</title>
  <meta name="description" content="Which ETSI, IETF and OpenID specifications the trust checks of the iGrant.io Organisation Wallet Suite implement, how it meets the trust requirements of the ARF v3.0.0 for verifiers, holder wallets, issuers and wallet providers, and the gaps that remain."/>
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import NoteBox from '@site/src/components/NoteBox';

<NoteBox title="Sources:" variant="info">
<ul>
<li><a href="https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-architecture-and-reference-framework/blob/v3.0.0/docs/annexes/annex-2/annex-2.01-high-level-requirements.md" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">ARF v3.0.0, Annex 2</a>: the high-level requirements</li>
<li><a href="https://github.com/webuild-consortium/wp4-trust-group/blob/main/task2-trust-framework/trusted-list-registration-trust-evaluation-matrix.md" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">WE BUILD WP4: Requirements Matrix: Trusted Lists, Participant Registration, and Trust Evaluation</a>, which extracts these requirements from Annex 2</li>
</ul>
</NoteBox>

## In short

* This page states which specifications the trust checks of the iGrant.io Organisation Wallet Suite implement, and how it meets the ARF v3.0.0 trust requirements of the roles that it plays: **verifier**, **holder wallet**, **issuer** and **wallet provider**.
* **Status** is one of three values:
  * **Supported:** the Organisation Wallet Suite does it, often once you turn on the Require switch of the check.
  * **Partly:** it does part of it; the note says which part.
  * **Not yet:** a gap.
* **The main gaps:** registration certificates (WRPRC), which the Organisation Wallet Suite neither sends nor checks yet, and the Certificate Transparency check of access certificates.
* The status is as of 18 November 2026. Requirements that bind Member States, registrars, certificate authorities or the Commission are out of scope.

## Specifications

| Specification | In the Organisation Wallet Suite | Status |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ETSI TS 119 612 V2.4.1: trusted lists | Reads trusted lists in XML as **ETSI TL** trust anchors: verifies the XAdES signature with the list signer certificate, follows the next update, reads entries, statuses and history | Supported |
| ETSI TS 119 602 V1.1.1: lists of trusted entities, XML | Reads lists of trusted entities in XML as **ETSI LOTE** trust anchors, for the profiles of Annexes D to I | Supported |
| ETSI TS 119 602 V1.1.1: lists of trusted entities, JSON | Reads the entries of a JSON list. Tested with the NXD Trust List, whose JSON signature does not verify; see [Interoperability](/docs/trust-interoperability/#findings) | Partly |
| IETF RFC 5280 §6: path validation | The path to a trust anchor of the role: the signatures, validity and CA rules of the path, the key usage of the signer certificate, and its revocation with the CRLs of a CA (X.509) trust anchor | Supported |
| IETF RFC 7515 (`x5c`) and RFC 9360 (`x5chain`) | Reads the signer chain of credentials, attestations, requests and status lists, and sends its own up to the trust anchor that you choose | Supported |
| ETSI TS 119 412-6 V1.1.1: certificate profiles of providers | Certificate presets for the CSRs of PID, wallet, EAA, QEAA and PuB-EAA providers | Supported |
| ETSI TS 119 411-8 V1.1.1: access certificates | Certificate presets for access certificates (WRPAC) of legal and natural persons | Supported |
| ETSI TS 119 475 V1.2.1: registration certificates | Neither sent nor checked | Not yet |
| OpenID4VCI 1.0: signed issuer metadata | The issuer signs its metadata with its access certificate key, and the holder wallet can require a trusted signer | Supported |
| OpenID4VP 1.0: `trusted_authorities` (`etsi_tl`, `aki`) and the client ID prefixes `x509_san_dns` and `x509_hash` | The verifier sends them, and the holder wallet checks them | Supported |
| IETF RFC 9162: Certificate Transparency | The trust checks do not check Signed Certificate Timestamps | Not yet |
| OpenID Federation 1.0 | | On the roadmap |

## ARF v3.0.0 requirements

### As a verifier

| Requirement | In short | Status | How |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| OIA_12 | Validate a PID with a trust anchor of a PID Provider LoTE | Supported | **Require a trusted credential signer**, with the PID Provider LoTE in **Accepted credential signers**. See [Trust When Verifying](/docs/trust-verification/). |
| OIA_13 | Validate the qualified signature of a QEAA (Art. 32), with a trust anchor of a QEAA Provider trusted list | Partly | The chain is validated to a trust anchor of the QEAA provider trusted list that you accept. The other checks of a qualified signature under Art. 32 are not part of the trust check. |
| OIA_14 | Validate a PuB-EAA with a trust anchor of a PuB-EAA Provider list | Supported | The same, with the PuB-EAA provider list |
| OIA_15 | Validate a non-qualified EAA with the trust anchors that its rulebook defines | Supported | The same, with any ETSI TL, ETSI LOTE or CA (X.509) trust anchor used as EAA provider |
| RPACANot_03 | Your access certificates can be authenticated with the trust anchors of a notified Access Certificate Authority | Supported | Sign requests with an access certificate key, issued by such an authority. See [Your Certificates](/docs/trust-own-certificates/). |
| RPRC_19, RPRC_20 | Include a registration certificate in each presentation request | Not yet | |

### As a holder wallet

| Requirement | In short | Status | How |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ISSU_07, ISSU_09, ISSU_10 | Validate a received PID, PuB-EAA or EAA with a trust anchor of its provider | Supported | **Require a trusted credential signer** in the holder configuration. See [Trust in Your Wallet](/docs/trust-holder-wallet/). |
| ISSU_08 | Validate the qualified signature of a received QEAA | Partly | As for OIA_13 |
| ISSU_23, ISSU_24, ISSU_33, ISSU_34 | Authenticate the access certificate of a PID provider or attestation provider before requesting issuance, with the trust anchors of the Access Certificate Authority LoTEs | Supported | **Require a trusted issuer**: the signer of the signed issuer metadata must be trusted as an access certificate provider. To accept only the EU lists, as ISSU_33 asks, put only Access Certificate Authority LoTEs in **Accepted issuers**. |
| ISSU_24a, ISSU_33a, ISSU_34a, RPRC_23 | Check the registration certificate of an issuer, and that it is registered for the type of credential | Not yet | |
| RPA_04 | Authenticate the access certificate of a relying party with the trust anchors of the Access Certificate Authority LoTEs | Supported | **Require a trusted relying party**, with Access Certificate Authority LoTEs in **Accepted relying parties** |
| RPRC_17, RPRC_17a, RPRC_21 | Check the registration certificate in a presentation request, its identifiers, and the requested attributes against it | Not yet | The dashboard shows the registration certificate as **Not supported**. |
| CT_05, CT_06 | Check that an access certificate has a valid Signed Certificate Timestamp | Not yet | |

### As an issuer (PID or attestation provider)

| Requirement | In short | Status | How |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ISSU_19, ISSU_28 | Accept the trust anchors of the Wallet Provider LoTE for WIAs and key attestations | Supported | The Wallet Provider LoTE in **Accepted wallet providers**. See [Trust When Issuing](/docs/trust-issuance/). |
| ISSU_21, ISSU_30, ISSU_30a | Verify the WIA and the key attestation with a trust anchor of the Wallet Provider LoTE, and that the wallet instance and its keys are not revoked | Supported | **Require a trusted wallet provider**. The issuer checks the signature, expiry and revocation of the WIA and of the key attestation. |
| ISSU_22, ISSU_32 | Sign the credential issuer metadata with the key of the access certificate | Supported | The access certificate key of the issuer configuration |
| PPNot_03, PPNot_04 | Your PIDs and access certificates can be authenticated with the notified trust anchors | Supported | Choose the trust anchor of each signing key. See [Your Certificates](/docs/trust-own-certificates/). |
| RPRC_22 | Include your registration certificate in the credential issuer metadata | Not yet | |

### As a wallet provider

| Requirement | In short | Status | How |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| WPNot_03 | WIAs and key attestations can be authenticated with the notified trust anchors | Supported | Each WIA and key attestation carries its chain in `x5c`, up to the trust anchor that you choose for the key |

### Lists

| Requirement | In short | Status | How |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| PPNot_07, WPNot_05, RPACANot_05, PuBPNot_03 | PID Provider, Wallet Provider, Access Certificate Authority and PuB-EAA Provider LoTEs in the format of ETSI TS 119 602, Annexes D, E, F and H | Supported | Kind **ETSI LOTE**, with the role PID provider, Wallet provider, Access certificate provider or PuB-EAA provider |
| RPACANot_05a | The LoTE of providers of registration certificates (Annex G) | Partly | It can be added with the role Registration certificate provider, but no check uses it yet |

## Known gaps

1. **Registration certificates (WRPRC).**
   * The Organisation Wallet Suite does not send a registration certificate as a verifier or as an issuer.
   * It does not check one as a holder wallet.
   * The Registration certificate provider role exists for trust anchors, but no check uses it yet.
2. **Certificate Transparency.** The checks of access certificates do not check Signed Certificate Timestamps.
3. **Qualified signatures of QEAAs.** The trust check validates the chain to a trusted list of QEAA providers, not the further checks of a qualified signature under Art. 32.
4. **Lists of trusted entities in JSON.** The entries are read. The signature of the NXD JSON lists, the only JSON lists tested, does not verify.
5. **Lists without entries, and registrars.**
   * A list with no entries cannot be added as a trust anchor.
   * No **Used As** role fits a list of registrars and registers (Annex I).
6. **OpenID Federation.** Not supported; it is on the roadmap.

## Related pages

* [Trust in the EU Digital Identity Wallet Ecosystem](/docs/trust-overview/)
* [Interoperability Tests: the WE BUILD and NXD Trust Lists](/docs/trust-interoperability/)
* [Trust Roles: Wallet Providers, Issuers and Relying Parties](/docs/trust-roles/)
* [Certificates and Certificate Chains](/docs/trust-pki/)
