Standards Support and Conformance: Trust in the iGrant.io Organisation Wallet Suite
Sources:
- ARF v3.0.0, Annex 2: the high-level requirements
- WE BUILD WP4: Requirements Matrix: Trusted Lists, Participant Registration, and Trust Evaluation, which extracts these requirements from Annex 2
In short
- This page states which specifications the trust checks of the iGrant.io Organisation Wallet Suite implement, and how it meets the ARF v3.0.0 trust requirements of the roles that it plays: verifier, holder wallet, issuer and wallet provider.
- Status is one of three values:
- Supported: the Organisation Wallet Suite does it, often once you turn on the Require switch of the check.
- Partly: it does part of it; the note says which part.
- Not yet: a gap.
- The main gaps: registration certificates (WRPRC), which the Organisation Wallet Suite neither sends nor checks yet, and the Certificate Transparency check of access certificates.
- The status is as of 18 November 2026. Requirements that bind Member States, registrars, certificate authorities or the Commission are out of scope.
Specifications
| Specification | In the Organisation Wallet Suite | Status |
|---|---|---|
| ETSI TS 119 612 V2.4.1: trusted lists | Reads trusted lists in XML as ETSI TL trust anchors: verifies the XAdES signature with the list signer certificate, follows the next update, reads entries, statuses and history | Supported |
| ETSI TS 119 602 V1.1.1: lists of trusted entities, XML | Reads lists of trusted entities in XML as ETSI LOTE trust anchors, for the profiles of Annexes D to I | Supported |
| ETSI TS 119 602 V1.1.1: lists of trusted entities, JSON | Reads the entries of a JSON list. Tested with the NXD Trust List, whose JSON signature does not verify; see Interoperability | Partly |
| IETF RFC 5280 §6: path validation | The path to a trust anchor of the role: the signatures, validity and CA rules of the path, the key usage of the signer certificate, and its revocation with the CRLs of a CA (X.509) trust anchor | Supported |
IETF RFC 7515 (x5c) and RFC 9360 (x5chain) | Reads the signer chain of credentials, attestations, requests and status lists, and sends its own up to the trust anchor that you choose | Supported |
| ETSI TS 119 412-6 V1.1.1: certificate profiles of providers | Certificate presets for the CSRs of PID, wallet, EAA, QEAA and PuB-EAA providers | Supported |
| ETSI TS 119 411-8 V1.1.1: access certificates | Certificate presets for access certificates (WRPAC) of legal and natural persons | Supported |
| ETSI TS 119 475 V1.2.1: registration certificates | Neither sent nor checked | Not yet |
| OpenID4VCI 1.0: signed issuer metadata | The issuer signs its metadata with its access certificate key, and the holder wallet can require a trusted signer | Supported |
OpenID4VP 1.0: trusted_authorities (etsi_tl, aki) and the client ID prefixes x509_san_dns and x509_hash | The verifier sends them, and the holder wallet checks them | Supported |
| IETF RFC 9162: Certificate Transparency | The trust checks do not check Signed Certificate Timestamps | Not yet |
| OpenID Federation 1.0 | On the roadmap |
ARF v3.0.0 requirements
As a verifier
| Requirement | In short | Status | How |
|---|---|---|---|
| OIA_12 | Validate a PID with a trust anchor of a PID Provider LoTE | Supported | Require a trusted credential signer, with the PID Provider LoTE in Accepted credential signers. See Trust When Verifying. |
| OIA_13 | Validate the qualified signature of a QEAA (Art. 32), with a trust anchor of a QEAA Provider trusted list | Partly | The chain is validated to a trust anchor of the QEAA provider trusted list that you accept. The other checks of a qualified signature under Art. 32 are not part of the trust check. |
| OIA_14 | Validate a PuB-EAA with a trust anchor of a PuB-EAA Provider list | Supported | The same, with the PuB-EAA provider list |
| OIA_15 | Validate a non-qualified EAA with the trust anchors that its rulebook defines | Supported | The same, with any ETSI TL, ETSI LOTE or CA (X.509) trust anchor used as EAA provider |
| RPACANot_03 | Your access certificates can be authenticated with the trust anchors of a notified Access Certificate Authority | Supported | Sign requests with an access certificate key, issued by such an authority. See Your Certificates. |
| RPRC_19, RPRC_20 | Include a registration certificate in each presentation request | Not yet |
As a holder wallet
| Requirement | In short | Status | How |
|---|---|---|---|
| ISSU_07, ISSU_09, ISSU_10 | Validate a received PID, PuB-EAA or EAA with a trust anchor of its provider | Supported | Require a trusted credential signer in the holder configuration. See Trust in Your Wallet. |
| ISSU_08 | Validate the qualified signature of a received QEAA | Partly | As for OIA_13 |
| ISSU_23, ISSU_24, ISSU_33, ISSU_34 | Authenticate the access certificate of a PID provider or attestation provider before requesting issuance, with the trust anchors of the Access Certificate Authority LoTEs | Supported | Require a trusted issuer: the signer of the signed issuer metadata must be trusted as an access certificate provider. To accept only the EU lists, as ISSU_33 asks, put only Access Certificate Authority LoTEs in Accepted issuers. |
| ISSU_24a, ISSU_33a, ISSU_34a, RPRC_23 | Check the registration certificate of an issuer, and that it is registered for the type of credential | Not yet | |
| RPA_04 | Authenticate the access certificate of a relying party with the trust anchors of the Access Certificate Authority LoTEs | Supported | Require a trusted relying party, with Access Certificate Authority LoTEs in Accepted relying parties |
| RPRC_17, RPRC_17a, RPRC_21 | Check the registration certificate in a presentation request, its identifiers, and the requested attributes against it | Not yet | The dashboard shows the registration certificate as Not supported. |
| CT_05, CT_06 | Check that an access certificate has a valid Signed Certificate Timestamp | Not yet |
As an issuer (PID or attestation provider)
| Requirement | In short | Status | How |
|---|---|---|---|
| ISSU_19, ISSU_28 | Accept the trust anchors of the Wallet Provider LoTE for WIAs and key attestations | Supported | The Wallet Provider LoTE in Accepted wallet providers. See Trust When Issuing. |
| ISSU_21, ISSU_30, ISSU_30a | Verify the WIA and the key attestation with a trust anchor of the Wallet Provider LoTE, and that the wallet instance and its keys are not revoked | Supported | Require a trusted wallet provider. The issuer checks the signature, expiry and revocation of the WIA and of the key attestation. |
| ISSU_22, ISSU_32 | Sign the credential issuer metadata with the key of the access certificate | Supported | The access certificate key of the issuer configuration |
| PPNot_03, PPNot_04 | Your PIDs and access certificates can be authenticated with the notified trust anchors | Supported | Choose the trust anchor of each signing key. See Your Certificates. |
| RPRC_22 | Include your registration certificate in the credential issuer metadata | Not yet |
As a wallet provider
| Requirement | In short | Status | How |
|---|---|---|---|
| WPNot_03 | WIAs and key attestations can be authenticated with the notified trust anchors | Supported | Each WIA and key attestation carries its chain in x5c, up to the trust anchor that you choose for the key |
Lists
| Requirement | In short | Status | How |
|---|---|---|---|
| PPNot_07, WPNot_05, RPACANot_05, PuBPNot_03 | PID Provider, Wallet Provider, Access Certificate Authority and PuB-EAA Provider LoTEs in the format of ETSI TS 119 602, Annexes D, E, F and H | Supported | Kind ETSI LOTE, with the role PID provider, Wallet provider, Access certificate provider or PuB-EAA provider |
| RPACANot_05a | The LoTE of providers of registration certificates (Annex G) | Partly | It can be added with the role Registration certificate provider, but no check uses it yet |
Known gaps
- Registration certificates (WRPRC).
- The Organisation Wallet Suite does not send a registration certificate as a verifier or as an issuer.
- It does not check one as a holder wallet.
- The Registration certificate provider role exists for trust anchors, but no check uses it yet.
- Certificate Transparency. The checks of access certificates do not check Signed Certificate Timestamps.
- Qualified signatures of QEAAs. The trust check validates the chain to a trusted list of QEAA providers, not the further checks of a qualified signature under Art. 32.
- Lists of trusted entities in JSON. The entries are read. The signature of the NXD JSON lists, the only JSON lists tested, does not verify.
- Lists without entries, and registrars.
- A list with no entries cannot be added as a trust anchor.
- No Used As role fits a list of registrars and registers (Annex I).
- OpenID Federation. Not supported; it is on the roadmap.