Get Your Organisation Trusted: Signing Keys, Certificates and Trust Anchors
- ETSI TS 119 412-6 V1.1.1: certificate profiles of PID, wallet, EAA, QEAA and PuB-EAA providers
- ETSI TS 119 411-8 V1.1.1: access certificates of wallet-relying parties (WRPAC)
- ETSI EN 319 412-1 (the
organizationIdentifierof a legal person), ISO/IEC 18013-5 (the IACA and document signer of an mdoc), and IETF RFC 5280 - ARF v3.0.0 §6.3.2.3 (access and registration certificates) and §6.6.3 (the chain is sent without its trust anchor)
In short
- Others trust your signatures in the same way that you trust theirs: they validate your certificate chain against a trust anchor of theirs, for your role.
- So each signing key needs a certificate of the right profile for its role, issued by a CA that the receivers trust.
- In the iGrant.io Organisation Wallet Suite, you choose for each signing key which certificate of its chain is the trust anchor that receivers must trust. The signature carries the certificates below it, never the trust anchor itself.
- For demos and tests, get your certificate or its CA on the NXD Trust List. For production, get it from a CA on the official list of your role.
Which certificate for which role
Generate the CSR of a key with the certificate preset of its purpose; see Key Management, Step 5. Then ask your CA or qualified trust service provider (QTSP) for that certificate profile.
| You sign | Role | Preset | Profile |
|---|---|---|---|
| PIDs | PID provider | pid-provider, pid-provider-mdoc | ETSI TS 119 412-6 |
| Qualified attestations | QEAA provider | qeaa-provider, qeaa-provider-mdoc | ETSI TS 119 412-6 |
| Attestations of a public sector body | PuB-EAA provider | pub-eaa-provider, pub-eaa-provider-mdoc | ETSI TS 119 412-6, with the QcPSB statement |
| Other attestations | EAA provider | eaa-provider, eaa-provider-mdoc | ETSI TS 119 412-6 |
| mdoc credentials, such as an mDL | mDL issuer (document signer) | mdoc-document-signer | ISO/IEC 18013-5 |
| WIAs and key attestations | Wallet provider | wallet-provider | ETSI TS 119 412-6 |
| Status lists | Status issuer | status-list-signer, mdoc-status-list-signer | |
| Presentation requests and signed issuer metadata | Access certificate | wrpac-legal, wrpac-natural | ETSI TS 119 411-8 |
Requests with the client ID prefix x509_san_dns | request-signer-san-dns | ||
| mdoc reader authentication | mdoc-reader | ISO/IEC 18013-5 |
The wallet compares the certificate that you upload with the preset of the key's CSR and warns you about differences (profile-mismatch), but it does not reject it. The fit of a key for a credential category is information, not a rule; see Credential Categories and Key Usage Types.
Key stores. A key can be in the local vault of the platform, an external vault (for example HashiCorp Vault), Google Cloud KMS, AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, Thales Luna Cloud HSM (DPoD), or with a qualified trust service provider over the CSC API. The wallet checks a QTSP key against the EU trusted list of the provider's country to show whether it is qualified. See Key Management, Step 2.
Choose the trust anchor of each signing key
A form that signs, such as a credential definition, the issuer configuration, a presentation definition or the wallet provider configuration, has the card Signing keys. It has one row for each use of a key:
| Use | Signs |
|---|---|
| Credential signing key | Each credential of a credential configuration |
| Status list key | The status lists of the credentials. Without a key of its own it uses the credential signing key and its trust anchor. |
| Access certificate key | Presentation requests, and the signed issuer metadata |
| Key of the WIAs | The WIAs of a wallet provider |
| Key of the key attestations | The key attestations of a wallet provider |
| Key of the status lists | The status lists of a wallet provider |
For each row, choose the key and its Trust anchor, the certificate of its chain marked Receivers must trust:
- The wallet sends the certificates below the trust anchor with each signature, in the
x5cheader, or inx5chainfor an mdoc. It does not send the trust anchor itself (ARF v3.0.0 §6.6.3). - Choose a root CA: receivers trust one certificate for all your keys, but each signature is larger.
- Choose the key's own certificate: each signature is smaller, but receivers must update their trust anchors whenever you renew the certificate.
- When you choose nothing, the wallet does not send a self-signed root.
The form refuses a trust anchor that is not in the chain of the key, an anchor of a chain that changed when the certificate was renewed, and a name that more than one certificate of the chain has. It then asks you to choose the trust anchor again.
Be on the list of your role
Receivers accept your signatures only when one of their trust anchors holds the certificate that you marked Receivers must trust, for your role:
- Another organisation on this platform adds that certificate as a CA (X.509) trust anchor with your role as Used As, or adds a list that contains it. See Manage Trust Anchors.
- For demos, interoperability tests and other non-production use, get listed on the NXD Trust List. See Register Your Organisation on a Trust List. The NXD Trust List registers the access certificate of a relying party directly.
- For production, use the official route of your role:
- A wallet provider is notified by its Member State after certification.
- A PID, QEAA or PuB-EAA provider is registered and notified.
- A relying party registers with the registrar of its Member State and gets its access certificate from an access certificate authority on the EU list (ARF v3.0.0 §6.2 to §6.4).
mdoc-iaca for mdoc, access for access certificates and request-signer-san-dns, and provider for all other presets. Its roots are not on any trusted list. Receivers on this platform trust a test certificate only when they add its root as a CA (X.509) trust anchor with the role of the certificate. Do not use it in production. See The built-in test CA.